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Abstract
Quotas or permits are frequently used in the management of renewable resources
and emissions. However, in many industries there is concern about the basic eec-
tiveness of quotas due to non-compliance. We develop an enforcement model of a
quota-regulated resource and focus on a situation with signicant non-compliance
and exogenous constraints on nes and enforcement budget. We propose a new
enforcement system based on self-reporting of excess extraction and explicit dif-
ferentiation of inspection rates based on compliance history. In particular, we use
state-dependent enforcement to induce rms to self-report excess extraction. We
show that such system increases the eectiveness of quota management by allow-
ing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than
under traditional enforcement, while ensuring an ecient allocation of aggregate
extraction. In addition, inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in
welfare.
JEL Classication: D61, H0, Q20, Q22, Q28
Keywords: Enforcement, Non-compliance, Self-reporting, Dierentiated inspec-
tions, Quotas, Emissions standards, Resource Management
We are grateful to Peder Andersen, Heather Eckert, R ognvaldur Hannesson and John Livernois for
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. All remaining errors and omissions
are our own.
yInstitute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
zInstitute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
xAlberta School of Business, University of Alberta, Canada, and SNF, Norway.
1FOI Working Paper 2010/10
1 Introduction
Common pool resources, such as clean air, sheries, ground water and forests, are
often regulated by extraction (or emission) quotas, and much research has been
devoted to the optimal design of quota-based systems. However, the productivity
growth in production technologies has strengthened the incentives for rms to vi-
olate quotas and increased the importance of ensuring eective enforcement. At
the same time, there seems to be widespread political reluctance to respond to the
challenge by increasing inspection resources and sanctions. The literature reects
these mounting non-compliance problems by showing an increasing focus on en-
forcement issues in resource management. Generally, increased compliance requires
tougher enforcement or tougher punishment. However, both options may be polit-
ically infeasible due to budgetary and legal constraints.1 This could leave resource
managers in a situation with substantial non-compliance problems but without the
ability to take further actions to reduce violations.
In this paper, we propose a reform of the traditional enforcement system that
increases the eectiveness of quota regulation while satisfying budgetary and le-
gal constraints. We analyze the welfare implications of the reformed enforcement
system within a standard resource model, and investigate whether it is possible to
achieve improved welfare without violating budgetary and legal constraints.
We develop a standard resource model where a given number of rms with het-
erogenous production costs harvest a resource that is regulated by non-tradable
extraction quotas. The enforcement model contains two important extensions of
the traditional quota enforcement model. First, rms may self-report resource ex-
traction in excess of quotas. Upon doing so the rm pays a given amount per
self-reported unit (a reduced \ne"). Hence, it becomes legal to exceed quotas as
long as the correct production level is reported and paid for. Second, we introduce
dierentiated inspections based on rms' compliance history. Firms that are in-
spected and found to exceed their quotas without correctly self-reporting this, are
moved into an inspection group with a higher inspection rate for a given period of
time. In addition, detected violators are prosecuted and punished (ned). Thus, we
propose a system of state-dependent enforcement with self-reporting. Note that in
contrast to much of the previous work on enforcement of environmental regulations,
quota violations can take on a continuum of values in our model. Consequently,
self-reports may not be truthful and inspections of rms that self-report are re-
quired.
1Fines are typically constrained by the principle that the punishment should be proportional to the
crime, which restricts the use of higher nes to combat illegal resource use. Furthermore, substantial
increases in enforcement costs are often politically infeasible due to budgetary constraints.
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Our results show that we can improve welfare by using state-dependent enforce-
ment to induce rms to submit correct self-reports. When nes are constrained, the
reformed enforcement system can always achieve a given aggregate production tar-
get more eciently than under traditional enforcement. This holds irrespectively of
whether we allow for dierentiated inspection rates across rms under traditional
enforcement. Furthermore, the proposed system increases the eectiveness of the
quota instrument, since it allows us to achieve a wider range of target production
levels. Hence, the proposed enforcement system increases both the eectiveness and
the eciency of enforcement. We provide an example and numerical results that
demonstrate these improvements, as well as possible limitations of the proposed
enforcement system.
To better understand the results, note rst that it is unattractive for rms to
be in the group where the inspection rate is high (\control hell"). The threat
of being moved into control hell is an additional deterrent that induces higher
compliance in groups where inspection rates are lower. If this threat is eective,
few rms enter the group with high inspection rates, and hence, the inspection
cost for this group is low. So far we are in line with the existing literature on
state-dependent enforcement. However, contrary to this literature, we also use
the threat of control hell together with a tight quota to induce rms to exceed
their quota and truthfully self-report. If all rms self-report excess extraction,
they all face the same shadow price of production, and hence, total production is
allocated eciently across rms. Consequently, it becomes more important to focus
on inducing truthful self-reporting than obtaining full quota compliance. This is in
contrast to recent results on enforcement of environmental regulations by Macho-
Stadler & P erez-Castrillo (2006).
Finally, the introduction of self-reporting and dierentiated inspections into the
management of quota-regulated resources represents another contribution of the
paper. These instruments are commonly used in environmental management, but
have not been analyzed as options for the management of renewable resources.
The enforcement literature has proposed both regulatory dealing and self-reporting
as mechanisms that can achieve increased compliance without increasing the num-
ber of inspections.2 First, high compliance rates combined with low sanction rates
2Other explanations for high compliance rates in environmental regulation with low sanctions and
inspection rates have been suggested. One explanation is the risk of repercussions on nancial and output
markets by violation of environmental regulations, which aect rm prots (see e.g. Hamilton, 1995;
Konar & Cohen, 1997; Anton et al., 2004). If consumers or investors care about the rm's environmental
reputation, their reaction to disclosures of non-compliance with environmental regulations could be costly
to the rm, which may explain higher compliance rates even though regulatory sanctions are small. Such
eects may be important in the case of large dierentiated rms that consumers and investors can identify
in the market, but are presumably less important for smaller, undierentiated rms that are not easily
identied in the market, such as those operating in many resource industries. See also Helland (1998),
Sandmo (2000), and Short & Toel (2008).
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can be the result of what Heyes & Rickman (1999) refer to as regulatory dealing
(Harrington, 1988; Greenberg, 1984; Heyes & Rickman, 1999). The basic idea is
that rms are given lenient treatment in some situations where they do not com-
ply in exchange for increased compliance in others. The mechanism we use in our
model is based on Greenberg (1984) and strengthens the incentives to compliance
by dening explicit rules that govern how inspection rates are dierentiated across
rms. Contrary to the existing literature, we use state-dependent enforcement (dif-
ferentiated inspections and sanctions) to induce rms to self-report, rather than to
increase compliance rates.
Second, self-reporting is commonly used in environmental regulation (Russell,
1990) and have proven to be eective in many cases where high compliance rates
are achieved even if sanctions and inspection rates are relatively low (Livernois &
McKenna, 1999). Much work considers the introduction of self-reporting into a ne-
based environmental regulation system, showing that this can increase compliance
and eciency (e.g. Malik, 1993; Kaplow & Shavell, 1994; Livernois & McKenna,
1999; Innes, 1999, 2001; Macho-Stadler & P erez-Castrillo, 2006; Evans et al., 2009).
The main advantage is that self-reporting allows the regulator to increase com-
pliance by focusing control resources on agents that do not self-report violations
(Kaplow & Shavell, 1994; Malik, 1993; Innes, 1999).3 Furthermore, self-reporting
may allow regulated agents to reduce their avoidance costs (Innes, 2001). The en-
forcement system must give agents incentives to self-report, for example by reducing
the ne for self-reported relative to unreported violations (Livernois & McKenna,
1999).
We use the case of the shery as an example throughout the paper. Most
sheries are quota regulated and illegal shing is currently widespread worldwide.
Recent estimates suggest that illegal and unreported catches constitute on average
about 20% of reported catches globally, with a total value of US$5-11 billion (Agnew
et al., 2009). A number of studies in the sheries economics literature investigate
optimal enforcement of a regulated shery within the traditional enforcement sys-
tem (Sutinen & Andersen, 1985; Milliman, 1986; Anderson & Lee, 1986; Furlong,
1991). Others consider the choice of regulatory instruments in the presence of
non-compliance (Charles et al., 1999; Chavez & Salgado, 2005). Our approach of
combining self-reporting and dierentiated inspections to increase the eectiveness
of a given inspection budget is a novel contribution both to this literature and the
general enforcement literature. This enforcement system can potentially yield sig-
nicant improvements in eciency also in other settings such as pollution, both in
terms of control eorts and emissions abatement.
3In the environmental literature, compliance is usually a binary choice (to comply with or violate
regulations). Hence, if one self-reports, there is no reason for such report to be untruthful.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic enforcement
model under the traditional quota enforcement system. The model is specied for a
quota regulated shery. In section 3, we introduce our proposed enforcement system
based on self-reporting and dierentiated inspections and proves theoretically that
the proposed system generally is both more ecient and more eective than the
traditional enforcement system. Welfare eects are analyzed in section 4. Section
5 provides a numerical example to illustrate the ideas. A simulation model is used
to illustrate optimal enforcement under the traditional and the self-report based
enforcement systems as well as to compare the two under dierent specications
and requirements with regard to the regulatory intensity needed. Section 6 provides
concluding remarks.
2 The Traditional Enforcement System
In this section, we develop a model of a quota-regulated shing industry consisting
of n rms that harvest a sh stock. A regulator sets a total quota that is allocated
in equal shares to the n rms as non-tradable quotas.4 The regulator can only
detect quota violations through costly inspections that allow him to observe rm
level catches.
The objective of the regulator is to maximize sustainable welfare. With a con-
stant output price, this is equivalent to maximizing aggregate industry prots net
of inspection costs. Under traditional enforcement, the regulator has two instru-
ments; the size of the total quota and the inspection rate. When a rm is inspected
and found to violate regulations, it can be ned. The maximum ne is assumed
exogenously given, and hence, higher nes cannot necessarily be imposed to reduce
illegal shing. Furthermore, there is a budget constraint on control eorts that
limits the inspection rate, since substantial increases in enforcement costs are often
politically infeasible due to budgetary constraints.
2.1 The Firms and the Resource Stock
Total harvest is subject to a resource constraint Xt = F(Xt) Yt, which states that
the change in the resource stock in period t equals the period's stock growth, F(Xt),
minus the total harvest, Yt. To keep the analysis tractable we disregard transition
dynamics and assume that the regulator compares sustainable states.5 That is, the
regulator considers sustainable catch level (Y ) and stock (X) combinations that
4In real-world sheries, many quota systems allow for some trade in quotas, but such trade is often
highly restricted.
5Accounting for transition dynamics would imply that the quota and other regulatory variables also
depend on the current stock size and therefore changes as the system approaches its steady state.
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satisfy:
Y = F(X); (1)
given the objective of maximizing aggregate sustainable prots net of inspection
costs.6
In a sustainable equilibrium without quota regulations, each rm in the indus-
try chooses the extraction level that maximizes its own prot conditional on the
resource stock:
i = pyi   c(yi;i;X); (2)
where p is the output price, yi is rm i's harvest, and c() is a cost function that
is increasing and convex in harvest quantity and decreasing in the size of the sh
stock X. The cost parameter i is rm specic, indicating cost dierences between
the n rms. All dierences between rms are captured in the cost parameter i.
Hence, the industry is uniquely characterized by the distribution of cost parameters
g().
Let y(i;X) denote the optimal harvest level of a rm with cost parameter i





Steady-state aggregate harvest must equal stock growth in each period. This implies
the following steady-state relationship between aggregate harvest and stock:
X
i
y(i;X) = F(X): (3)
A large resource stock lowers marginal extraction costs ( @2c
@y@X < 0). Hence, sus-
tainable combinations of large stock and yield are preferable. Without regulations,
however, rms with relatively low marginal costs harvest too much and the stock
is driven down. Hence, the sustainable unregulated equilibrium is characterized
by low yield and stock levels. In certain cases, the stock can even be driven to
extinction. Regulations are introduced because of this externality in resource ex-
traction. The purpose of regulation is to reduce extraction below the uncoordinated
level to reach the preferred equilibrium. Next we introduce quota regulation and
enforcement.
2.2 The Regulator and Enforcement
Each rm is allocated a non-transferable quota, q. The rm chooses whether to
comply with its quota, knowing that quota violations come at the risk of being ned
if detected. The regulator can only observe the rms' harvest levels by conducting
6The analysis presented in the following generalize to a dynamic setting. However, while this com-
plicates derivations, it does not aect the general results nor does it provide additional insights into the
functioning of the suggested enforcement system.
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costly inspections and is constrained by an inspection budget that allows for a given
number of inspections per period, m < n. Without dierentiation between rms,
this results in an inspection rate of  = m
n < 1 for each rm per period of time.
The cost per inspection is cm. We assume that each rm is inspected at the most
once per period, and that the inspection accurately reveals the actual harvest level
of the rm in that period (no inspection error). Hence, we disregard the possibility
of rms making several shing trips per period.
A ne up to a maximum of f can be imposed per unit harvested in excess of the
quota. The maximum ne is exogenously given by legislation and statutes, and is
assumed to be high enough to fully deter quota violations if applied with certainty.
The regulator knows the industry's cost function and the statistical distribution
of cost parameters g(), but does not know the individual rm's cost parameter
i. All n rms are allocated the same resource quota q =
Q
n, where Q is the
total allowable harvest.7 Firms choose harvest quantities to maximize prots net
of expected ne payments (cf. equation 2), i.e.:8
y
i (i;q;;X) = argmax
yi
[ (yi;i;X)   f (max(0;yi   q))] (4)
The regulator maximizes total sustainable industry prot net of enforcement costs.
Assuming that the ne is set to its maximum value, f, the problem of the regulator


















i (i;q;;X)dg() = F(X)
0    m
n
(5)
The rst line of the problem (5) is the sum of industry extraction prot, which
is given as the number of rms n multiplied by the average extraction prot over all
rms, minus inspection costs (cmn). Industry prot depends on the distribution of
the cost parameter . The problem is to choose the quota and inspection rate that
maximize extraction prots subject to three constraints: (i) rms choose prot
maximizing harvest quantities (second line), (ii) aggregate harvest equals stock
growth in equilibrium (third line), and (iii) the inspection rate does not cause a
violation of the inspection budget (fourth line).
7Note that regulators typically dierentiate quotas according to e.g. the type and size of the rm. This
is not our focus and to keep the analysis tractable we disregard this. Extending the model accordingly
is straight forward.
8We disregard price or cost dierences between sh extracted legally and illegally. The analysis easily
generalizes to the case of price and/or cost dierences between legal and illegal extraction.
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If it is necessary to cap aggregate catches, the solution to the problem (5) is to
set quotas tight enough for all rms to catch illegally. All rms are then constrained
by the expected ne on illegal catches rather than by the quota. The regulator then
sets inspection rates () so that the optimal catch level is achieved, given that the
available inspection budget allows for it. This ensures an ecient allocation of
the aggregate catch target since all rms face the same marginal shadow price of
catches.9
The standard regulatory approach in sheries seems to be to take the enforce-
ment system and its costs as given (i.e., x inspection costs at the allowed maxi-
mum) and use the resource quota q as the only policy instrument.10 Hence,  is
xed at its maximum level,   = m


















i (;q;  ;X)dg() = F(X)
(6)
For large values of q no rms are constrained by the quota. As q is tightened,
there is a point at which some rms become constrained, and from this point
onward quota reductions reduce aggregate harvest. As we continue to reduce q,
more rms become constrained and the shadow cost of the quota increases for
those already constrained. At some point the quota constraint is so restrictive
that the most ecient rms choose to harvest illegally.11 From this point onward,
these rms do not respond to further reductions in quotas since they are restricted
by the expected ne, not the quota. If we continue to reduce q, more and more
rms exceed their quota and the eectiveness of the quota instrument is gradually
reduced. Eventually, all rms exceed the quota and further quota reductions do
not aect aggregate harvest. At this point, the quota instrument is completely
ineective.
In a situation where most rms are quota constrained, the allocation of pro-
duction shares is inecient since heterogeneous rms are constrained by a uniform
quota. The standard recommendation in such situation is to make quotas tradable,
which allows for an equalization of shadow prices of catches across rms. However,
in many sheries there are substantial non-compliance problems and one may be
close to or at the point where all rms violate quotas. In such cases, (almost) all
9In contrast, if rms were constrained by the uniform catch quota or by dierent expected nes,
aggregate catch would be allocated ineciently because the marginal shadow price of catches would
dier across rms.
10This implies spending the entire inspection budget, and consequently, a maximization of the inspec-
tion rate .
11This occurs when the marginal shadow cost of their quota exceeds the expected ne.
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rms are exceeding their catch quotas and are thus constrained by the expected
ne on illegal catches. When all rms face (and perceive) the same inspection
probability, their shadow prices of catches become identical. Consequently, total
catches are allocated eciently across rms. The main problem in such situation
is that further reductions in aggregate harvest cannot be achieved by tightening
the quotas. It may therefore be well-founded when resource regulators seem more
concerned with the lack of eectiveness of quotas than with quota tradability.
When constrained by the inspection budget, the eectiveness of enforcement
increases if we dierentiate inspection rates between rms. Although such dier-
entiation typically is not part of the formal enforcement system, this may be what
control agencies try to do when targeting rms that in the past have been less com-
pliant than others.12 This increases the enforcement eectiveness if these rms are
in fact more responsive to changes in expected nes. However, such dierentiation
leads to dierences in the expected punishment between rms, and consequently,
reduces the eciency of the aggregate catch allocation.
We must consider alternative enforcement schemes to achieve further reductions
in aggregate harvest while ensuring an ecient allocation. The self-report based
system introduced next aims at doing just that.
3 The Self-Report Based Enforcement Sys-
tem
We now propose an alternative to the traditional quota enforcement system based
on self-reporting and dierentiated inspection rates. Although illegal shing is a
considerable problem worldwide (Sumaila et al., 2006; Agnew et al., 2009), nei-
ther self-reporting nor dierentiated inspections have been formally analyzed in
the context of sheries, nor have they been applied in sheries regulation.13
We present the alternative enforcement system within the same framework as
we used for traditional enforcement above. There are, however, some important
dierences. Instead of inspecting all rms with the same probability, rms are
assigned to one of two enforcement groups that dier in inspection probabilities;
group 1 with low probability of inspection, and group 2 with high probability of
inspection. In the rst group, rms are allowed to self-report harvest quantities in
12To our knowledge, dierentiated inspection rates are not a formal part of the enforcement system in
any shery. However, we know that at least in some sheries, inspectors do to some degree target rms
that based on their compliance records are perceived to have a higher likelihood of violating regulations.
13Some regulatory systems have elements that resemble self-reporting. In many regions, such as
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, and the United States, shing vessels are
required to keep logbooks with information about their catches and harvest activities. However, the key
element of a self-report based enforcement system, namely that rms are given incentives to self-report
violations, is to our knowledge not part of current sheries regulation systems.
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excess of quota, in which case there is a rebate on the ne paid. If inspected rms
are found to have self-reported all excess catches they remain in the rst group. If
they have not, they must pay the full ne and are moved to the second inspection
group. The threat of being moved to the second group, the so-called \control hell"
with high inspection rates, is an eective deterrent that makes it possible to increase
rms' perceived punishment relative to traditional enforcement, without increasing
inspection costs.14 In addition, the self-reporting scheme allows the regulator to
use the self-report rebate, that is, the reduction in ne when a rm self-reports
excess catches, as an additional control variable. This increases the exibility of
the enforcement system and makes it possible to increase the allocation eciency
of the system, as we show below.
The idea of using the threat of control hell to strengthen the rms' incentives
to comply without increasing nes or inspection costs was originally proposed by
Greenberg (1984). We use it in basically the same form but for a dierent purpose;
to induce self-reporting of violations rather than compliance. Self-reporting of vio-
lations in the environmental enforcement literature is often seen as a way to increase
eciency by reallocating inspection resources to rms that do not self-report viola-
tions (Kaplow & Shavell, 1994; Malik, 1993; Innes, 1999). This is because violations
in these models can take on only one value and a self-reported violation by a ra-
tional agent therefore must be truthful. In our setting, quota violations can take
on a continuum of values and therefore require inspection to ensure truthfulness.
This type of violations is considered by Macho-Stadler & P erez-Castrillo (2006),
but they nd that enforcement resources should be focused on inducing compliance
rather than truthful self-reporting. In our case, we enforce an inecient allocation
of quotas and it is therefore better to allow rms to exceed their quotas and in-
stead induce truthful self-reporting of excess catches, which improves the allocative
eciency.
3.1 The Regulator and Enforcement
A rm's inspection probability depends on whether the rm is in group 1 or group 2
and is denoted j 2 [0;1], where j = 1;2 refers to the group. A rm in group 1 that
self-reports harvest in excess of quota must pay a ne rf per unit, where r 2 (0;1)
is a factor representing the ne rebate for self-reporting. In group 2, self-reporting
gives no rebate, hence, a rm that self-reports must pay the full ne f per unit.
Furthermore, a rm in group 1 that is inspected and found to have underreported
its quota violation must pay the full ne and is moved to group 2. Once in group 2,
14There are several possibilities to make control hell even crueler and thereby strengthen its deterrence
eect, such as to introduce quota reductions for rms in control hell.
10FOI Working Paper 2010/10
the rm stays there until found to have self-reported correctly during u consecutive
inspections after which the rm is moved back into group 1.
Table 1: Punishment Scheme
Group 1 Group 2
Self-report Violate Self-report Violate
Not inspected rf(yi   q) 0 f(yi   q) 0
Inspected rf(yi   q) f(yi   q) f(yi   q) f(yi   q)
Inspection prob. 1 2 > 1
Violate: move to group 2 Full self-reporting u times:
move to group 1
The inspection probabilities in table 1 are determined by the regulator and
are constrained by the inspection budget. As under the traditional enforcement
system, the regulator can perform a given number of inspections per year, denoted
m, which determines the inspection probability. If all rms are equally likely to be
inspected (all rms are in group 1), the inspection probability is 1  m
n .15 The
inspection rate is higher in group 2 than in group 1. Hence, the more rms there
are in inspection group 2, the lower the inspection rate can be in group 1.16 As
before, the maximum ne is exogenously given and high enough to fully deter quota
violations if applied with certainty.




 (y;;X)dg() c^ n, where ^  refers to the average inspection rate over both
inspection groups (weighted average). However, now the set of policy instruments
available to the regulator includes two inspection rates (1 and 2) and the period
of time a detected violator must be in control hell (group 2) before it can be moved
back into group 1.
To ensure an ecient allocation of aggregate catch across rms, the regulator
sets the total quota suciently low for the individual quota to bind for all rms,
thereby inducing them to exceed the quota. As discussed above, this results in all
rms having the same marginal harvest cost, and hence, an ecient catch allocation.
3.2 The Firms
Under self-report based enforcement, the rm has four main options. It can (i)
comply with its quota, (ii) report the entire illegal extraction, (iii) report some of
15The inspection probability is assumed to be positive and strictly below one.
16In general, the following must hold: 1  2 > 1 > 0. In addition, the inspection budget cannot be
exceeded, which implies that 1 
m 2n2
n n2 , where n2 is the number of rms in inspection group 2. This
implies that if the severity of control hell is constrained, there exists a possibility that too many rms
end up in group 2, thereby draining group 1 for inspection resources.
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the illegal extraction, or (iv) not report any extraction in excess of the quota. With
a ne structure that is linear in illegal quantity and detection probabilities being
constant, it is easily shown that the rm either reports all or does not self-report
any excess extraction. Thus, the relevant options for a rm are reduced from four
to three, as option (iii), where one exceeds the quota and reports only part of the
excess quantity, is never chosen.
This leaves us with three distinct behavioral strategies a prot-maximizing rm
can use. The rm chooses the strategy that yields the highest sum of discounted
future prots.17
Strategy A: Stay in group 1. To ensure that the rm is never moved into group
2, the rm must always comply with regulations. Consequently, the rm must
self-report any excess extraction (options i or ii). Since the quota is set su-
ciently low for no rm to nd option (i) optimal, only option (ii) remains. In




[ (yi;i;X)   rf (yi   q)], which gives a net expected prot of a
i =  (ya
i ;i;X) 
rf (ya
i   q). If we let EV a
i denote the present value of future prots for rm i when







where  is the discount factor.
Strategy B: Alternate between groups. To alternate between groups, the rm
must be willing to violate regulations while in group 1 and comply with regulations
while in group 2. Thus, the behavior of a rm that follows strategy B depends on the
inspection group the rm is currently in. In group 1, the rm violates quotas (option
iv), while in group 2, the rm self-reports all excess extraction (option ii). Formally,
when in group 1, the rm chooses yb1
i = argmax
yi
[ (yi;i;X)   1f (yi   q)], which



























. In the rst period under this strategy, the rm
is in group 1 and expected prot is b1
i . The inspection rate  is the probability
of being moved to group 2 in the next period, and hence, expected prot in the
next period is (1   )b1
i + b2
i . In every future period t the rm perceives some
probability 0  i(t)  1 of being in group 2 (where i(0) = 0, i(1) = , etc.).
Hence, the expected prot in period t is (1   i(t))b1
i +i(t)b2
i . Thus, the present
17For more complex punishment schemes in repeated games, see Abreu (1988) and the literature that
followed on optimal penal codes.
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where 0  i(t)  1 for all t.
Strategy C: Stay in group 2. To always be in group 2, the rm must never
comply with its quota nor self-report excess extraction. Thus, the rm's only




[ (yit;i;Xt)   2f (yit   qt)], with corresponding net expected
prot of c
it =  (yc
it;i;Xt) 2f (yc
it   qt). The present value of future prots for







Since the maximum ne (f) by denition is suciently high to fully deter vio-
lations if applied with certainty, it is never optimal for a rm to play strategy C in
group 2 when 2 = 1.18 Hence, strategy C is always dominated by self-reporting
for rms in group 2 (strategy B). Thus, rms choose either strategy A or strategy
B.
4 Welfare implications
We now turn to developing the core results of the paper. We do this by comparing
welfare under the dierent enforcement systems; self-report based enforcement and
traditional enforcement with and without dierentiation of inspection rates.
Compared to traditional enforcement, there are several additional policy instru-
ments available under the self-report based system. Introducing more enforcement
policy variables to the regulator's toolbox, cannot reduce welfare if policy variables
are set optimally, since the traditional enforcement system is a possible specica-
tion. In the following, we prove two propositions showing that there generally is a
welfare gain when shifting to the self-report based enforcement system.
The rst proposition considers the situation where quotas under the traditional
enforcement system have been tightened so much that all rms violate. In this
situation, all rms are constrained by the expected ne and not the quota, hence,
18As long as the budget constraint allows, 2 = 1. If many rms end up in group 2 at the same time,
it is possible that 2 = 1 cannot be achieved without violating the inspection budget. This is easily dealt
with by introducing additional inspection groups that are even less attractive to rms, or by increasing
the deterrence eect of group 2 in other ways, such as by introducing quota reductions. We therefore
ignore this possibility in the following.
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further quota reductions have no eect on aggregate harvest. The rst proposition
states that a self-report based enforcement system allows the regulator to imple-
ment further welfare increasing reductions in aggregate harvest, while ensuring an
ecient distribution of these reductions across rms. The second proposition con-
siders the situation where quotas under traditional enforcement are still eective,
that is, some rms are constrained by the quota. The proposition states that in
such case, the aggregate catch target can be implemented more eciently under
self-report based, state-dependent enforcement.
Proposition 1. When all rms violate quotas so that aggregate harvest cannot
be reduced further under traditional enforcement, there generally exists an enforce-
ment system with self-reporting and dierentiated inspections that reduces aggregate
harvest and allocates this reduction eciently among rms without increasing the
inspection cost of the enforcement agency.
Proof. The proof of proposition 1 begins by considering a dierentiated inspection
system where the inspection rates are 1 =  and 2 = 1, and where the ne rebate
factor when self-reporting is r = . Noting that quotas are exceeded by all rms
when the expected ne is f, we have ya
i = argmax
yi




[ (yi;i;X)   f (yi   q)], and yb2
i = argmax
yi
[ (yi;i;X)   f (yi   q)].
From (2) we know that () is concave. In addition, we know that rf = f < f
and yb2
i = q. Consequently, the net expected prots associated with the harvest
levels of the dierent strategies are so that a = b1 > b2.
This implies that ta





for all t when 0 














where the term on the right-hand side (RHS) is EV a
i and the term on the left-hand
side (LHS) is EV b
i . Furthermore, with i(1) =  and b1 > b2 it is clear that
condition (4) can only hold with equality if  = 0. Hence, EV a
i = EV b
i only occurs
if the rm completely disregards the future. The expected present value of strategy
A is strictly larger than that of strategy B if  > 0. It follows that for  > 0,
where EV a
i is strictly greater than EV b
i , there exists a value of r =  + , where
 is a small positive constant, for which strategy A dominates for all rms. Thus,
with self-reporting and dierentiated inspection rates it is possible to reduce illegal
catches slightly, without exceeding the exogenous constraint on the imposed ne
or the inspection budget. Since all rms choose strategy A, no rms enter group
2, and hence total inspection costs equal cn. Furthermore, since all rms self-
report all quantities in excess of quotas and pay rf per unit, rms' optimal harvest
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quantities ensure that all rms face the same marginal shadow cost of harvesting in
equilibrium. Consequently, the aggregate harvest reduction is allocated eciently
across rms.
Corollary 1. In the situation specied in proposition 1, an enforcement system
with self-reporting and dierentiated inspections allocates a reduction in aggregate
harvest more eciently than what is possible with dierentiation of inspection rates
under traditional enforcement.
Proof. From proposition 1 it follows that the self-report based enforcement system
with dierentiated inspections allocates the reduction eciently. Hence, increased
eciency is impossible regardless of enforcement system used. Furthermore, any
reduction in aggregate catch resulting from a dierentiation of inspection rates un-
der the traditional enforcement system implies a corresponding dierentiation of
expected nes. Since any dierentiation of expected nes results in inecient al-
location of aggregate catch, such allocation must be strictly less ecient than the
allocation implemented by the enforcement system with self-reporting and dier-
entiated inspections.
Proposition 2. When some rms under traditional enforcement do not violate
quotas, there generally exists an enforcement system based on self-reporting and
dierentiated inspection rates that implements the same aggregate catch target more
eciently without increasing the inspection cost of the enforcement agency.
Proof. Consider the same dierentiated inspection system as above, with inspection
rates 1 =  and 2 = 1 and with a self-report rebate factor of r = . From the
proof of proposition 1 it is clear that EV a
i > EV b
i for all rms that violate their
quotas when  > 0. If the rebate factor r is increased marginally, this is also
the case for  = 0. Thus, all rms that violate their quota choose strategy A
and self-report violations. Now, consider a quota reduction to the point where all
rms choose to exceed their quotas. This results in aggregate harvest below the
target. Next, reduce inspection rates in group 1 and increase the self-report rebate
factor proportionally until aggregate harvest again reaches the target level. The
proportional reductions in  and r ensure the dominance of strategy A over strategy
B, and hence, all rms continue to follow strategy A. Since all rms exceed their
quota and fully self-report, they all face the same marginal shadow cost of catch in
equilibrium. Hence, the aggregate catch target under self-report based enforcement
is implemented eciently. By assumption, some rms are constrained by quotas
and not nes under traditional enforcement. Hence, the aggregate catch target
under traditional enforcement is implemented ineciently. Furthermore, since all
rms choose strategy A under self-report based enforcement, no rms enter group
2. Consequently, inspection rates in group 1 are reduced, which implies lower total
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inspection costs than under traditional enforcement: cn  C. It follows that
it is possible to reach the same aggregate production target more eciently than
under traditional enforcement with lower inspection costs, without exceeding the
exogenous constraint on the ne.
Irrespectively of how intensive the quota enforcement is under traditional en-
forcement (with uniform inspection rates), a shift to the proposed self-report based
enforcement system generally allows the regulator to increase welfare. Our focus is
on the situation where traditional quota regulation is no longer eective (covered by
proposition 1 and its corollary). In this situation, the advantages of the proposed
enforcement system arise from the combination of dierentiated inspection rates
and the possibility to self-report excess harvest. First, with two inspection groups,
the risk of being moved to control hell increases expected punishment relative to the
traditional compliance system, but without increasing inspection costs or exceeding
the maximum ne. Second, self-reporting allows the regulator to use the self-report
rebate rather than the harvest quota as the control variable when implementing the
aggregate harvest target. This ensures an ecient allocation of the total harvest
quantity across heterogenous rms. Hence, reducing aggregate catch by shifting to
an enforcement system with self-reporting and dierentiated inspections results in
a strictly greater welfare gain than what would result from any dierentiation of
inspection rates within the traditional enforcement system.
5 Quantifying welfare eects: An Example
We have shown that a shift to the proposed self-report based enforcement system
generally increases welfare and that the welfare gain is strictly greater than what
could result from a dierentiation of inspection rates within the traditional system.
However, if such a reform is to be an attractive option in practice, the welfare gain
must be substantial. If the eectiveness problem under traditional enforcement is
small or if there are political or legal constraints on the amount of time violators
can be assigned to control hell this may limit the welfare advantage of introducing
the proposed enforcement system. Furthermore, if dierentiation of inspections
within the traditional system is a possibility, this might be an attractive second-
best enforcement strategy.
In the following, we investigate this using numerical simulations within a stan-
dard parametrization of the model developed above. We calculate and compare
the welfare of the model shery under (i) traditional enforcement, (ii) traditional
enforcement with dierentiated inspections, and (iii) self-report based enforcement
with and without constraints on the severity of control hell. We do this for dier-
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ent parameterizations of the model, which reect dierent levels of the eectiveness
problem under traditional enforcement (see appendix A for more details).
5.1 Parametrization
We assume functional forms that are standard in the natural resource economics
literature. The resource constraint (1) is specied using the logistic growth function
(see e.g. Clark, 1976):







where h and K, respectively, denote the intrinsic growth rate and the carrying
capacity of the resource stock. Extraction costs in (2) have the quadratic functional
form (see e.g. Smith, 1969)





where the rm specic cost parameter  is uniformly distributed: g() = 1
  
for      . Except for the sensitivity of harvest costs to changes in stock
size, which depends on the so-called stock-output elasticity, the chosen parameter
values do not signicantly aect relative performance of the enforcement systems.
Parameter values are therefore normalized. Our model parametrization implies a
stock-output elasticity of 0.5 which is in the insensitive tail of the distribution of
empirical estimates of this parameter.19 The derivation of individual and aggregate
catch levels and an overview of parameter values used in the simulation model can
be found in appendix A.
Finally, we assume that the regulator seeks to implement the maximum sus-
tainable yield (MSY) of the shery and that he is only concerned with welfare
in long-run sustainable states.20 With this target and parametrization, the eec-
tiveness problem of traditional enforcement can be given a precise and intuitive
form.
We wish to compare welfare under alternative enforcement systems at dierent
levels of the aforementioned eectiveness problem under traditional enforcement.
To do this we dene an indicator of how challenging it is for the regulator to reach
19The cost function specied in (11) is equivalent to the production function y = a0E0:5X0:5, where
E is shing eort and a0 is a productivity parameter. Hence, the implied stock-output elasticity is 0.5.
This is close to parameter estimates for the most cost insensitive types of sheries; schooling sheries.
See e.g. Bjrndal (1987), who estimates production functions for herring.
20The MSY target and the focus on sustainable states facilitate parsimonious comparisons of enforce-
ment systems. However, the results presented are in fact simulated using a dynamic model and generalize
to the dynamic setting and to other policy objectives than the MSY target, including that of maximizing
economic yield (MEY). Note that the MEY diers from the MSY when costs are as in (11). However,
when the objective is MSY, the target stock level is independent of the intrinsic growth rate, which we
vary in the following. The target stock level under an MSY objective is half of the pristine stock level.
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the management objective: the required regulatory intensity (RRI). For the shery
model specied above, the regulator's challenge increases as the intrinsic growth
rate is reduced. The lower the growth rate, all else equal, the stronger the need for
regulation and enforcement in order to maintain a certain stock level. The stock
regenerates more slowly at low values of h, and hence, equilibrium catches are
lower. Firms' incentives to harvest are, however, unchanged. This calls for tougher
enforcement to ensure that the target stock level is maintained, and hence, the RRI
is higher. If the intrinsic growth rate is suciently high (h   h), no regulation
of catches is necessary and we say that the required regulatory intensity (RRI) is
zero. At the other end of the scale, the toughest challenge the regulator can face is
a shery with an intrinsic growth rate close to zero. In this case, enforcement and
regulations must ensure an almost complete elimination of shing eort.
On this basis, we can formally dene the RRI. First, let  h denote the intrinsic
growth rate where the unregulated shery would result in MSY.21 Next, we can
dene the required regulatory intensity as:




The RRI is a function of the growth rate of the stock. The RRI is normalized to
lie between zero and one. RRI is zero when the growth rate of the stock is at its
upper bound and one when the growth rate is at its lower bound (arbitrarily close
to zero). As the growth rate is gradually reduced from its upper toward its lower
bound, the RRI gradually increases toward one.
In the following we make welfare comparisons for dierent levels of RRI (cor-
responding to dierent levels of the intrinsic growth parameter h in our model).
We start at the RRI value for which the traditional inspection system has just
become ineective and compare welfare for three alternative enforcement systems
at increasing levels of RRI. Under the rst enforcement system, the regulator uses
traditional enforcement with an undierentiated inspection rate. The regulator
sets the inspection rate to its maximum, as given by the inspection budget, and
quotas low enough to ensure that all rms produce illegally. As RRI increases, the
regulator cannot do anything to tighten regulations or enforcement. The simula-
tions reect the welfare loss from the suboptimal stock reduction occurring when
landings are too high to maintain MSY. As RRI increases, the distance between
the target stock and the implemented stock increases and so does the associated
welfare loss.
The second enforcement system we consider is traditional enforcement with dif-
ferentiated inspection rates. The advantage of dierentiation is that target stocks
can be implemented at higher RRI values than without dierentiation. The disad-
21For a given parametrization of the model,  h is a constant. See appendix A.1 for details.
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vantage is that the catch allocation across rms becomes inecient because rms
do not face the same expected nes. The simulations capture the sum of these
two eects. We assume that inspection rates are dierentiated optimally across
rms. This represents the upper bound on regulatory performance in terms of
quota implementation under traditional enforcement for a given inspection budget.
The third enforcement system we consider is our proposed self-report based sys-
tem. As we have shown, this system is capable of attaining the target stock and
ecient allocation at the initial point, i.e., the point where traditional enforcement
is marginally ineective. The simulations reect how much of the potential welfare
is captured at increasing values of RRI, both in the unconstrained and constrained
cases. We assume that inspection rates are set at the maximum allowed by the bud-
get, that quotas are not reduced for rms in group 2 and that the self-report rebate
is always set low enough to ensure that no rm plays strategy B where there is a risk
of entering group 2. These restrictions are introduced for technical tractability but
are not generally ecient. Thus, we nd a lower bound on regulatory performance
under this system.
5.2 Comparison of enforcement systems
In the following we compare welfare net of inspection costs for each of the three
enforcement systems.22
Results are summarized in table 2. Traditional enforcement with a uniform in-
spection rate is ineective at RRI values above 0.40. Beyond this RRI value, all
rms exceed their quotas and quota reductions no longer aect aggregate catch.
Maximal welfare is achieved at precisely this RRI value under traditional enforce-
ment, as indicated in table 2. When increasing the RRI beyond 0.40, catch alloca-
tions continue to be ecient but the traditional system can no longer implement the
aggregate catch target because the inspection budget constraint has been reached
and the enforcement eort cannot be increased any further. As a result, the equilib-
rium stock level falls further and further below the target, which reduces welfare. In
contrast, the unconstrained self-report based system is both eective and ecient
over the full range of RRIs and implements the rst-best solution. This generates
considerably higher welfare over a large interval of RRIs.23 For an RRI of 0.5, the
traditional system only achieves 89.5% of the potential welfare while the equilib-
rium aggregate catch is 4.1% below the target level. As the RRI increases, the
22We assume that the full inspection budget is used under all cases considered. Hence, it is appropriate
to compare welfare before deduction of inspection costs.
23We do not allow the regulator to adjust inspection costs (i.e., the number of inspections). For the
self-report based system there is a trade-o between inspection rates and time spent in control hell. We
therefore want to focus on welfare from other sources since it may not be feasible in real-world situations
to have very high values of u.
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gap between the outcomes under the traditional system and the self-report based
system increases. For high values of RRI, that is, for slow growing species, tradi-
tional enforcement cannot prevent extinction. In our example, this happens at RRI
 0:74 (cf. table 2).
Table 2: Equilibrium welfarea and yield for dierent RRIs by enforcement system. Scores
relative to rst-best solution (100 = optimal).
RRI 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.74
Welfare Yield Welfare Yield Welfare Yield Welfare Yield
First-best solution 26.83 76.66 23.96 63.88 20.44 51.11 14.45 33.22
Trad., uniform insp. 100 100 89.5 95.9 65.7 75.1 5.8 7.3
Trad., di. insp. 100 100 66.3 99.4 55.2 88.3 0 0
Self-rep., unconstr. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Self-rep., u = 2 100 100 95.53 98.91 77.86 85.97 21.26 25.58
a Welfare before deduction of inspection costs, which are identical for all cases considered.
As long as the RRI is low, it is optimal under traditional enforcement to let
the inspection rate be the same for all rms in order to promote ecient alloca-
tion of aggregate catch. However, when the objective of MSY can no longer be
achieved with an undierentiated inspection rate (i = 0:2; 8i), illegal shing can
be reduced by increasing the inspection rates of the most cost ecient rms, while
reducing the inspection rates facing the least ecient rms. We explore this possi-
bility by introducing perfect dierentiation of inspection rates under the traditional
system.24
The numerical analysis shows that with perfectly dierentiated inspection rates,
the MSY catch target can be achieved at RRIs below 0.47, compared to 0.41 with a
uniform inspection rate. By targeting those rms that have the highest sensitivity
to changes in expected punishment (i.e., the most cost ecient rms), the regulator
can reach the catch target for a wider range of RRIs. However, this reduces the cost
eciency of the industry because it causes inecient allocation of catches across
rms. According to our simulation results, this causes a loss of welfare relative
to undierentiated enforcement, even when dierentiation achieves aggregate catch
levels close to or at the target level. This is illustrated in table 2, where aggregate
catch levels under traditional enforcement for RRIs of 0.4 and 0.5 are higher when
inspection rates are perfectly dierentiated, while welfare levels are considerably
lower. For an RRI of 0.5, the regulator almost achieves the catch target by per-
24As noted, this represents the best possible outcome in terms of achieving the MSY target by use of
dierentiated inspection rates. In real industries, regulators do not have perfect information on rm-level
costs and must settle with imperfect dierentiation of inspection rates.
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fectly dierentiating inspection rates (99.4%). However, the inecient allocation
of catches causes a signicant reduction in welfare (33.7% reduction compared to
rst-best solution). Hence, with perfect dierentiation of inspection rates under
traditional enforcement, the loss in welfare from inecient allocation of catches
across rms exceeds the welfare gain from increased aggregate yield.
Consistent with the formal results derived above, we see that self-report based
enforcement is always at least as ecient as the traditional system. When the RRI
is only slightly higher than the value where traditional enforcement becomes inef-
fective, little is gained from introducing the self-report based system. If, however,
the need for enforcement is high relative to available enforcement resources, the po-
tential gains from introducing the self-report based system can be considerable. We
have thus far assumed that u, the number of periods a detected violator must spend
in group 2 (control hell), can be chosen freely. In real-world resource management,
u may be constrained for legal/political reasons or as a safeguard against imprecise
inspection results and inadvertent harvester errors in self-reports. We therefore
conclude this section by investigating the implications of imposing an upper limit
on the enforcement parameter u. The results for the self-report based system with
the number of periods in control hell constrained to u = 2 are shown in table 2.25
Our numerical results show that self-report based enforcement is considerably
less exible when the number of periods a violater is conned to control hell (u) is
constrained. The lower the upper limit on u, the smaller the interval of RRIs over
which the enforcement system is capable of reaching the target harvest level. The
constrained self-report based enforcement system can maintain the target equilib-
rium level for RRIs below 0.41 (u = 1), 0.42 (u = 2) or 0.43 (u = 3).26 Thus,
the RRI at which a severely constrained enforcement system no longer can achieve
the harvest target is only extended slightly compared to the traditional system
and not nearly as much as under the traditional system with perfect dierenti-
ation. Nonetheless, the constrained self-report based system is still signicantly
more ecient. As is evident from table 2, this system generates signicant welfare
gains compared to traditional enforcement. The higher the RRI, the larger the gain
compared to traditional enforcement since the marginal value of improved enforce-
ment increases. Finally, in our simulation, the constrained self-report based system
achieves a higher welfare level than the perfectly dierentiated traditional system
25As noted, when u is constrained, it is no longer necessarily optimal to set policy parameters so that
all rms are induced to choose strategy A (self-reporting). To keep things tractable, we assume in the
simulations that the self-report rebate factor r is set just low enough to induce all rms to choose strategy
A. The r value can be calculated from equation (A.9) in the appendix, by setting 0 = . Thus, the
simulations in the table reect a lower bound on this system's performance.
26To improve the performance of a constrained self-report based system, we can introduce quota
reductions for rms in group 2. In general, any strategy can be used that makes control hell more hellish
and thereby further deters rms from choosing strategy B.
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can achieve even though that system achieves a higher equilibrium stock (yield).
The higher welfare is due to the welfare loss from inecient allocation under the
traditional system with dierentiated inspections.
As noted above, the relative performance of traditional enforcement with dif-
ferentiated inspections increases if the sensitivity of industry costs to stock size is
reduced. When the stock-sensitivity of costs is low, ineective regulation leads to a
larger reduction in the resource stock, all else equal. This implies that the welfare
gain from increasing the eectiveness of regulation by dierentiating inspections
increases. The welfare loss from suboptimal catch allocation is, however, not sig-
nicantly aected by changes in the stock-output elasticity. Hence, dierentiation
of inspections within the traditional system yields the largest potential gain when
harvest costs are insensitive to changes in stock size. Thus, by further decreasing
the stock-output elasticity implied by our model, traditional dierentiated inspec-
tions would outperform a highly constrained self-report based system at RRI values
where the self-report based system is no longer eective. However, the sensitivity
of industry costs to stock size implied by our simulation model is already in the
lower tail of the range of empirical estimates. In addition, the implementation of
perfectly dierentiated inspections requires that regulators can identify and focus
inspections on the most cost ecient harvesters. This is dicult in the real world,
where cost parameters are typically private information. Thus, while we cannot rule
out the possibility that traditional enforcement with dierentiated inspections in
certain situations outperforms a highly constrained version of the self-report based
system, this is generally not the case. Furthermore, as long as the constraints on
the self-report based system are not too tight, this will never be the case.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present an alternative enforcement system for quota-regulated in-
dustries. The system is based on self-reports of quota violations and dierentiation
of inspection rates based on rms' compliance records. Firms that exceed their
quotas and self-report pay a reduced ne. We address a situation with signicant
non-compliance problems, and where both the punishment for quota violations and
the inspection budget are constrained. Under traditional enforcement, once these
constraints are binding, further quota reductions are ineective as they cannot be
enforced (all or most rms violate their quotas). Inspection agencies may try to
address this issue by target inspections on rms with poor compliance records to
increase enforcement eectiveness. This, however, comes at the cost of reduced
allocative eciency.
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The enforcement system we propose is based on explicit and well-dened dier-
entiation of inspection rates contingent on correctly self-reported quota violations.
Rather than targeting rms that are perceived to be more responsive to changes in
expected nes, we introduce the threat of a control hell to all rms. Any rm that
is detected exceeding its quota without having correctly reported this, faces higher
inspection rates for a certain period of time. This threat strengthens deterrence.
Furthermore, by relying on self-selection through the self-reporting component, our
system increases the eectiveness of inspections, or the range of total extraction
targets that can be reached, without prior knowledge about individual rms' re-
sponsiveness to incentives. Finally, correct self-reporting increases the allocative
eciency compared to quota compliance, a result that is independent of the initial
distribution of quotas. Hence, we achieve increased eectiveness in enforcement
without reducing the allocative eciency.
We use a numerical example to demonstrate these improvements, as well as pos-
sible limitations of the proposed enforcement system. The main limitation is that
the system's ability to increase the enforcement eectiveness depends on possible
constraints on the severity of punishment in control hell. However, our results show
that even with tight constraints on control hell the self-report based system gener-
ates signicant welfare gains relative to traditional enforcement when the inspection
budget is constrained. Dierentiating inspections across rms under traditional en-
forcement does generally not increase welfare compared to our proposed system
and this represents an unlikely special case.
The use of state-dependent enforcement to induce rms to self-report is a novel
contribution to the general enforcement literature. Although we have used the case
of the shery as an example in our analysis, the proposed enforcement system can
generate signicant welfare gains if applied to other industries facing regulatory non-
compliance problems. One example is the enforcement of emissions standards. Note
in that respect that the system we propose resembles a system with a combination
of non-tradable quotas and a tax on production when rms are induced to always
self-report. In addition, we introduce the risk of control hell to make sure rms do
not deviate.
Our results imply a shift in focus away from inducing quota compliance per
se, toward correct self-reporting of violations. This implies a number of additional
advantages not captured by our analysis. First, as pointed out by Innes (2001),
once regulated rms correctly self-report, they no longer have an incentive to avoid
inspections. In many industries there may be signicant avoidance opportunities,
and consequently, the costs of avoidance and combating avoidance may be substan-
tial (Anderson & Lee, 1986; Milliman, 1986). The welfare eect of not incurring
such costs may be substantial, which further increases the relative eciency of the
proposed enforcement system. A second advantage is the reduced risk for rms.
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As noted by Kaplow & Shavell (1994), risk-bearing costs are eliminated under
self-reporting, which is relevant if rms are risk averse. A third advantage is the
possibility of increased precision in extraction and stock estimates when rms re-
port actual extraction. The value of decreased measurement error depends on the
characteristics of the resource but can be signicant. Hence, in addition to the
advantages we have focused on in this paper, the proposed self-report based en-
forcement system has several other advantages that further increase the potential
welfare gain relative to traditional enforcement.
There are several possibilities for extending this work. One possibility is to
analysis welfare eects of introducing the proposed self-report based system to
other quota regulated industries, such as pollution, water and forest management.
Another relevant extension is to relax the assumption that inspections perfectly
reveal actual production levels. Finally, we have ruled out the possibility that rms
self-report only part of the production level that exceeds their quota by assuming
a linear punishment function. Hence, allowing for a more complex punishment
function may yield additional results.
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APPENDIX
A Deriving aggregate catch levels
We start out by presenting the parametrization of the theoretical model used in the
simulations. In the following subsections, we show how aggregate catch levels are
calculated under traditional and self-report based enforcement.
A.1 Model parametrization
The parameter values used in the simulations are given in table A.1.
Table A.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
p 0.5 Price (per unit)
f 1 Fine (per unit)
[;  ] [75;125] Interval, cost parameter 
n 100 Number of shing rms
m 20 Total number of inspections given by budget
h [0;1:0217] Interval, intrinsic growth rate of resource stock
K 500 Carrying capacity of sh stock
Recall that the cost parameter  is uniformly distributed over the interval [;  ].
Based on the parameter values from table A.1, there are n = 100 agents with cost
parameters ranging from  = 75 to   = 125.
The interval for the intrinsic growth rate h given in table A.1, represents the
range of growth rates we analyze. Note that there is no variation in the growth rate,
instead we evaluate the performance of the self-report based system over a range of
intrinsic growth rates representing dierent types of sheries. At low growth rates,
there is a high need for enforcement to meet the aggregate catch objective. As we
increase the growth rate, the need for enforcement declines until h =  h = 1:0217,
when no enforcement is needed. In this case, the aggregate catch target is reached
under open access.
A.2 Traditional enforcement system
Prots for compliant and non-compliant rms are given by equations (4) and (11).
By solving the prot maximization problem of the rm for any value of i, it can
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for i  ^ 
X
i (p   f) for i < ^ ;
(A.1)
where ^  is the value of the rm-specic cost parameter  for which a rm would
be indierent between compliance and non-compliance.
A.3 Self-report based enforcement system
To calculate aggregate harvest as a function of the self-reporting rebate when rms
choose strategies A and B, we start out by analyzing optimal rm-level behavior.











(p   1f) (A.3)
y
b2 = q; (A.4)
where subscripts a, b1, and b2 denote a rm choosing strategy A (in group 1), a rm
choosing strategy B currently in group 1, and a rm choosing strategy B currently
in group 2, respectively. By substituting catch response functions from equations
(A.2-A.4) into equation (3) and adjusting for the long-run shares of strategy B rms
that are in groups 1 and 2, an expression for aggregate catch can be found.
We can now calculate the value of  for which a rm is indierent between
strategies A and B, which we denote 0. Strategy B, is relatively more attractive
to more productive rms (low i) because their gains from not self-reporting excess
catches in group 1 are greater than for less productive rms (with high i). Thus,
if some rms prefer strategy B to strategy A it must be rms with low values of i.
We now derive the value of  that makes a rm indierent between strategies
A and B, which we denote 0. The present value of all future payos for a rm



















28FOI Working Paper 2010/10
This can be rewritten as follows:27
EVb = 
















1   (1   1)   1u+1 : (A.8)
The value of i that separates rms choosing strategy A from rms choosing
strategy B can be identied by equating the present values of the two strategies
(EVa = EVb) and is denoted 0. We substitute in for the maximized prot func-
tions, 
a = X
2 (p   rf)
2 + rfq and 
b1 = X
2 (p   1f)
2 + 1fq, and obtain:
X





20 (p   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1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  X (p   1f)
2 (1   ) = 0
(A.10)







where A , B and D are dened as follows:












1   (1   1)   1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D = X (p   rf)
2  
1   (1   1)   1u+1
  X (p   1f)
2 (1   ):
Firms with i  0 nd it optimal to use strategy A, while rms with lower
production costs (i) choose strategy B.
Finally, we calculate the aggregate catch response function under the assumption
that u can be set high enough to ensure that all rms chose strategy A. This
requires that u is set high enough for the inequality   0(u) to hold, where
0(u) is given by equation (A.11). We use the reaction function of strategy A rms
27We assume that rms take the current level of the stock, as well as all policy variables, as given
when considering future operations and prots.
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from equation (A.2). In addition we know the probability density function of the
uniformly distributed variable , which is 1
   (for     ^ ). Given that there
is a continuum of rms, total catches can be expressed as:
Y =
nX (p   rf)
    
ln

 


: (A.12)
30